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I. INTRODUCTION
with past Survey periods, federal and state courts in Texas con-
tinued to discuss issues relating to expert qualification and relia-
bility under Daubert and Robinson in different factual scenarios.
Texas courts during this Survey period also resolved disputes involving
expert report requirements under chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code. Despite the Texas Legislature's attempts to stream-
line (and perhaps limit) the filing of healthcare liability claims, courts
continue to struggle with chapter 74's enhanced expert report require-
ments. Separately, Texas courts continued to address issues regarding the
assertion and waiver of attorney-client and work product privileges. Fi-
nally, additional cases during this period discussed rules relating to hear-
say, relevance, authentication, and witness credibility.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. CASES INVOLVING TEXAS RULE OF EVIDENCE 702, ROBINsON, 1
and GAMMILL2 Continue to Dominate Civil Evidence Issues
It almost goes without saying that in any Survey period, the vast major-
ity of cases involve disputes over qualification of experts and reliability of
their reports. This Survey period is no exception.
1. Several Courts in Texas, Including the Texas Supreme Court, Have
Expanded and Clarified the Requirements of Robinson and
Gammill
Several Texas cases addressed expert reliability standards under Texas
Rule of Evidence 702, including a Texas Supreme Court decision that an-
alyzed "whether expert medical causation testimony from a treating phy-
sician relying on a differential diagnosis [was] reliable and, therefore,
legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict."' 3 In Transconti-
nental Insurance, "Charles Crump received a kidney transplant in 1975
and began a lifelong regimen of immunosuppressant drug therapy to en-
sure his body would not reject the new kidney."'4 In May 2000, he "struck
his right knee on a piece of machinery" while working with Frito Lay that
1. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
2. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
3. Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 213 (Tex. 2010).
4. Id. at 214.
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caused a contusion and a hematoma. 5 "He applied for and received
workers' compensation benefits for the work-related injury," and "[a]fter
a series of increasingly serious health complications ... [and] lengthy hos-
pitalizations, [he] died in January 2001 at age forty-three. His wife, Joyce
Crump, applied for workers' compensation death benefits, alleging that
the May 2000 injury was a producing cause of her husband's death."'6 At
the administrative trial, "Crump's expert and treating physician, Daller,
testified that the wound site of the May 2000 work-related injury became
infected, the infection caused Crump's already-weakened organs to fail,
and his organ failure in turn caused his death."' 7 "A [workers' compensa-
tion] officer found that the May 2000 injury resulted in Crump's death
and awarded death benefits," and "the workers' compensation appeals
panel affirmed the hearing officer's benefits award."'8 "Frito-Lay's work-
ers' compensation carrier, Transcontinental Insurance Company, sought
judicial review of the administrative award of death benefits."9
The Texas Supreme Court looked at the "reliability of a treating physi-
cian's opinion based on ... differential diagnosis"-a diagnostic method
where a "physician form[s] a hypothesis as to likely causes of a patient's
presented symptoms and eliminates unlikely causes by a deductive pro-
cess of elimination." 10 The critical and interesting issue involved an argu-
ment by Crump that because differential diagnosis was an established
medical technique, courts should use a "less strict" application of the
Robinson factors to assess the reliability of expert testimony." Indeed,
the court of appeals below did not even apply the Robinson factors on the
basis that the technique was reliable and used by the treating physician. 12
However, the supreme court, setting a high bar for even accepted scien-
tific techniques, disagreed. "The mere fact that differential diagnosis was
used does not exempt the foundation of a treating physician's expert
opinion from scrutiny-it is to be evaluated for reliability as carefully as
any other expert's testimony. Both the Robinson and Gammill analyses
are appropriate in this context.' 3
The supreme court then turned to the specific Robinson and Gammill
factors. First, the court noted that despite the fact that differential diag-
nosis is generally accepted by the medical community and subjected to
use, peer review, and testing, this did not necessarily mean that technique
was automatically reliable "in every case in which a treating physician
bases his opinion on differential diagnosis."'14 However, the court deter-
mined this factor weighed in favor of Daller's differential diagnosis be-
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 215.









cause Transcontinental's expert agreed with the treatment methodology
Daller used. 15
Second, the supreme court considered whether "a physician's differen-
tial diagnosis may be too dependent upon the physician's subjective
guesswork or produce too great a rate of error-for example, when there
are several consistent, possible causes for a particular set of symptoms."
16
The court held "Daller's testimony adequately excluded . . . the other
plausible causes raised by the evidence. ' 17 The court noted "objective
evidence of Crump's good health before his injury, his contraction of an
infection at the site shortly afterward, and the ... effect of the infection
on his health."18 The court also stated the evidence with respect to other
potential causes did not have to be conclusive but only required "reason-
able medical certainty. '"19
The supreme court then addressed Gammill, which requires an analysis
of whether there is "an analytical gap between the data" or of expert
observations and the ultimate opinion offered.20 In this case, the su-
preme court concluded there was no analytical gap because Daller "di-
rectly treated or oversaw Crump's treatment on repeated occasions after
Crump's work-related knee injury. a21 This suggests that a treating physi-
cian makes a good testifying expert.
In U.S. Renal Care, Inc. v. Jaafar, the court of appeals assessed the
reliability of an expert report involving the valuation of accounts receiva-
ble. In that case, Bob Ehl, Laura Jaafar, and Lisa Lewis (Sellers) sold
their company Rencare, Ltd. to U.S. Renal Care.22 "The Sale Agreement
... stated Renal Care would acquire 100% of the stock in Rencare, but
Sellers would retain all accounts receivable for services rendered by Ren-
care prior to the closing date."'23 After the sale, a dispute "arose over the
accounting for the pre-sale receivables. '24 "Sellers relied on the expert
testimony of Gene Trevino to support their damage award," while Renal
Care argued that "Trevino's testimony was inadmissible based on his lack
of qualifications and his unreliable damage model."'2 5 The court of ap-
peals concluded the methodology and assumptions used by Trevino were
unreliable under Texas Rule of Evidence 702.26
15. Id. (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex.
1995)) ("noting that the Robinson reliability inquiry focuses 'solely on the underlying prin-
ciples and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate"')).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 218.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 219 (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 727
(Tex. 1998)).
21. Id.
22. U.S. Renal Care, Inc. v. Jaafar, No. 04-09-00043-CV, 2011 WL 1158032, at *1 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Mar. 30, 2011, no pet. h.).
23. Id.
24. Id.




Rule 702 allows a witness "who is 'qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education' to 'testify ... in the form of an
opinion or otherwise' when 'scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue." 27 "A two-prong test governs whether expert
testimony is admissible: (1) the expert must be qualified, and (2) the testi-
mony must be relevant and based on a reliable foundation. '2 8 "Expert
testimony is unreliable if it is based on unreliable data, or 'if the expert
draws conclusions from [his underlying] data based on flawed methodol-
ogy.'" 2 9 "Expert testimony is also unreliable if 'there is simply too great
an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." 30 The
court of appeals noted, however, that courts may apply the less rigorous
Robinson factors, rather than the stricter Gammill analytical gap test in
certain circumstances. For example, in Whirlpool Corp. v. Camacho, the
Texas Supreme Court in 2009 held that:
In determining whether expert testimony is reliable, a court may
consider the factors set out by the Court in Robinson and the ex-
pert's experience. However, in very few cases will the evidence be
such that the trial court's reliability determination can properly be
based only on the experience of a qualified expert to the exclusion of
factors such as those set out in Robinson, or, on the other hand,
properly be based only on factors such as those set out in Robinson
to the exclusion of considerations based on a qualified expert's
experience. 31
The court of appeals initially analyzed Trevino's qualifications to testify
regarding the value of accounts receivable. Renal Care argued that Tre-
vino was not qualified because:
(1) [A]lthough [he] ha[d] his bachelor's and master's degrees, they
[were] in the field of finance, not accounting, and his Ph.D. [was]
from an online university; (2) although he [was] a Certified Financial
Analyst.... he [was] not certified as a Certified Public Accountant;
(3) he ha[d] published no peer reviewed articles and his non-peer
reviewed articles deal[t] with being an expert witness; and (4) he
ha[d] no training or experience concerning insurance practices or
healthcare billing [which impacted the valuation of receivables.] 32
Somewhat surprisingly, the court of appeals concluded the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by holding that Trevino was qualified. 33 The
court noted particularly that "Trevino testified to extensive experience in
27. Id. (quoting TEX. R. Evio. 702).
28. Id. (citing E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 554 (Tex.
1995)).
29. Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 713 (Tex. 1997)).
30. Id. (quoting Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex.
1998)).
31. Id. at *6 (quoting Whirlpool Corp. v. Camacho, 298 S.W.3d 631, 638 (Tex. 2009)).




valuing businesses over the preceding twenty years," including experience
in valuing the accounts receivable of "several physician practices, clinics,
ambulatory surgery centers, home health care agencies, nursing agencies,
and physical therapy businesses."'34 "He [was] also accredited as a 'credit
senior appraiser' . . . by the American Society of Appraisers and had
taught courses on their behalf."'35
The court of appeals reached a different conclusion, however, with re-
spect to the second Robinson prong that "requires courts to assess
whether the expert's methodology is relevant and based on a reliable
foundation. ' 36 Trevino used what he termed a "Balance Sheet Ap-
proach" in which he "took a percentage of what's been paid on the
amount billed in the past and applied that percentage to the amounts
outstanding. '37 In terms of the data underlying the analysis, Trevino tes-
tified he relied on two reports that identified the patients receiving ser-
vices from January 2005 to the date of sale February 23, 2006.38 "The two
reports split the accounts receivable into patients with Medicare (the 77-
page report) and patients who were private pay (the 44-page report). '39
"Trevino applied the same methodology to both" reports regardless that
the accounts were subject to different types of payment from Medicare
and private payors. 40 Moreover, he did not review any of the underlying
documents upon which the reports were based.41 For example, "[h]e
never examined the underlying explanation of patient benefits (EOBs)
from the insurers or Medicare to determine the reasons for non-payment
or reduced payment. '42 Likewise, Trevino did not age any outstanding
receivable or conduct any "independent analysis or testing to determine
if aging had affected Rencare's accounts receivable. '43
The court of appeals concluded Trevino's opinion was unreliable under
either the analytical gap approach or against the Robinson factors.44 The
court held that his analysis "was subjective, his assumptions were un-
founded, his opinion ha[d] not been subjected to peer review, and his
technique ha[d] an unknown rate of error. '45 The court also criticized
the fact that Trevino did not "look at the data behind the numbers" on
the reports and "assumed that aging the accounts would not be neces-
sary."'46 Moreover, Trevino "did not do any analysis to determine if the
zero entries in the reports were due to lapse of coverage, improper bill-
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at *6.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *7.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at *9.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *10.




ing, reduced coverage, or other insurance problems. '47 The court thus
concluded that "there [was] simply too great an analytical gap between
the data and Trevino's testimony.
4 8
In Fitzpatrick v. Watson, the court of appeals addressed the Gammill
requirement that the expert report did not have an analytical gap be-
tween the data relied on by the expert and the expert's ultimate conclu-
sions.49 In Fitzpatrick, Thomas Lee Fitzpatrick and his wife sued an
emergency room physician, David Watson, alleging he failed to order an
x-ray after Mr. Fitzpatrick was injured that revealed the presence of a
glass shard in his arm.50 As a result of the physician's negligence, the
plaintiffs claimed Mr. Fitzpatrick suffered "permanent loss of use in his
hand."51 The critical aspects stem from the plaintiffs' allegation that Wat-
son was potentially impaired in light of evidence that he used cocaine on
prior occasions. 52 The plaintiffs did not have any direct evidence that
Watson was impaired at the time he performed the surgery. 53 Instead,
the plaintiffs offered an expert report from a board-certified psychiatrist
opining that "Watson was experiencing cocaine induced impairment at
the time he treated [Mr.] Fitzpatrick. ' 54 The opinion was "based upon an
extrapolation from admission by Watson that he had been abusing co-
caine regularly" for over a year, and the frequency of his usage was "eight
times per month" and "two times per week. '55 Thus, the expert con-
cluded that Watson "could have been high" or in withdrawal at the time
of the procedure. 56 The expert acknowledged, however, that he never
conducted a urinalysis or blood test, did not disclose the methodology he
used for his extrapolation and admitted he was unaware of the amount of
cocaine used or Watson's "rate of consumption. '57 The court of appeals
concluded there was an "analytical gap" in the expert's analysis in light of
his failure to describe his methodology for extrapolating cocaine use.58
B. THE ONGOING STRUGGLE OF CHAPTER 74 CONTINUES
Courts in Texas also addressed the more detailed requirements under
chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which gener-
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex.
1998)).
49. Fitzpatrick v. Watson, No. 12-08-00084-CV, 2010 WL 337330, at *2 (Tex. App.-
Tyler Jan. 29, 2010, no pet.).
50. Id. at *1.
51. Id. As an aside, it is difficult to understand why the claim was not subject to chap-
ter 74 because it involved a medical liability claim. Moreover, the court of appeals did not
discuss the expert report requirements of chapter 74, which might have imposed a higher
standard with respect to the reliability of the report.
52. Id.
53. See id. at *1-2.







ally govern the submission of expert reports in the context of healthcare
liability actions. Over the last decade, parties have enthusiastically ar-
gued whether a physician is "qualified" to give opinions under chapter 74
and this year was no exception.
1. General Standards
In TTHR, L.P. v. Guyden, defendant Presbyterian Hospital unsuccess-
fully moved to dismiss a medical malpractice lawsuit on the basis the ex-
pert report failed to meet the requirements of section 74.351 of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code.59 Under that section, an expert re-
port must: (1) "be authored by a qualified 'expert"' and (2) set forth the
expert's opinions regarding the "standard of care, breach, and causa-
tion. '60 "A report that merely states the expert's conclusions as to the
standard of care, breach, and causation" is inadequate. 61 Moreover, an
"expert must explain the basis for his statements and link his conclusions
to the facts." 62
On appeal, the defendant argued the expert was not qualified "to opine
on causation because he [was] not licensed to practice medicine in
Texas."'63 The hospital relied on the fact the term "physician" is not de-
fined in the expert report provisions but is defined elsewhere in section
74.001(a)(23) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code as "an indi-
vidual licensed to practice medicine in [Texas]. '"64 The court of appeals
disagreed, noting that "neither section 74.351(r)(5)(c) nor the Texas
Rules of Evidence explicitly require a physician to be licensed in
Texas. '65 The court of appeals also analyzed the legislative history of
chapter 74 and concluded the statute was intended to define the type of
defendant entitled to protection under the state's medical malpractice
statute, not what type of expert could provide a report.66
The court of appeals then analyzed the expert's qualifications and con-
cluded they were sufficient to permit the expert to opine on the proper
treatment for chronically ill patients with urinary tract infections noting
that: (1) the expert was licensed and in good standing in Pennsylvania and
Missouri; (2) he had practiced medicine since 1977; (3) he was a board
certified internist with subspecialties in Critical Care Medicine and Pul-
monary Disease; (4) he "managed and/or directed the management of
hundreds of patients with similar medical conditions" as the deceased;
and (5) he had both experience regarding the transfer of critically ill pa-
tients and the documentation required for such transfers-two issues in
59. TTHR, L.P. v. Guyden, 326 S.W.3d 316, 318-19 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2010, no pet.).
60. Id. at 319 (citing TEX. Civ. PRc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2011)).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 320.
64. Id.
65. Id.; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(23) (West 2011).
66. TTHR, L.P., 326 S.W.3d at 320-21.
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dispute in the case.67
In Tenet Hospitals Ltd. v. Boada, the El Paso Court of Appeals reached
the same conclusion using tools of statutory construction.68 The court
began with a detailed analysis of the statutory scheme in chapter 74. In
subchapter A titled "General Provisions," "Physician" is defined as "an
individual licensed to practice medicine in [Texas]. '"69 However, in sub-
chapter H (the portion of the statute specifically governing expert re-
ports), the term "Expert" is defined as follows:
[W]ith respect to a person giving opinion testimony about the
causal relationship between the injury, harm, or damages claimed
and the alleged departure from the applicable standard of care in any
health care liability claim, a physician who is otherwise qualified to
render opinions on such causal relationship under the Texas Rules of
Evidence. 70
Finally, in subchapter I titled "Expert Witnesses," the term "physician"
is defined as "a person who is: licensed to practice medicine in one or
more states in the United States. '71 The court of appeals concluded that
the more specific statutory definition of "physician" in subchapter I,
which dealt specifically with expert witness qualification, controlled over
the general definition of physician in chapter 74.72
Other cases in Texas have addressed whether an expert in one field
could opine on causation in another. For example, Anderson v. Gonzalez
is one of a long line of cases focusing on the extent of knowledge and
education of a physician proffering an expert report, even if the physician
practices in a different area of medicine.73 In Anderson, the Eastland
Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to an expert report filed pursuant
to chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The defendant
doctor argued the expert was not qualified because he was a radiologist
who was testifying on the cause of a premature infant's cardiac arrest that
resulted in a child's death.74 The injuries allegedly occurred as a result of
an improperly placed PICC line that the expert asserted should have
been discovered in a chest X-ray.75
The court began its discussion by summarizing the requirements of an
expert report under chapter 74. Section 74.351 sets forth the procedural
requirements for submitting an expert report in a medical malpractice
67. Id. at 320.
68. Tenet Hosp. Ltd. v. Boada, 304 S.W.3d 528, 538-39 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, pet.
denied).
69. Id. at 536 (quoting TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(23)(A) (West
2011)).
70. Id. (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(r)(5)(C) (West 2011)).
71. Id. (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.401(g)(1)).
72. Id. at 538.
73. Anderson v. Gonzales, 315 S.W.3d 582, 587-88 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2010, no
pet.).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 584.
2011]
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claim.76 An expert report must be dismissed if it "does not represent an
objective good faith effort to comply with the definitions of the expert
report," which is further defined to mean a written report that contains "a
fair summary of the expert's opinions ... regarding applicable standards
of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health
care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship
between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed."'77
To comprise "a good faith effort, the report must discuss the standard
of care, breach, and causation with sufficient specificity to inform the de-
fendant of the conduct the plaintiff has called into question and to pro-
vide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit. '78
An expert must also be qualified to give expert testimony regarding "the
causal relationship between the damages ... and the alleged departure
from the applicable standard of care;" to do this "an expert must have
knowledge, skill, experience, training or education regarding the specific
issue before the court that would qualify the expert to give an opinion. '79
"A physician who is not of the same school of medicine could still be
qualified to testify as an expert if he has practical knowledge of what is
usually and customarily done by a practitioner under circumstances simi-
lar to those confronting the defendant. '80
The court concluded the expert witness in Anderson did not have to be
an expert in cardiology.81 Instead, the fact that the expert regularly per-
formed this type of procedure-specifically the review of chest X-rays-
in his practice on a daily basis sufficed, because he had the experience,
knowledge, and training to opine regarding the proper placement of a
PICC line.82 Reviewing the expert's curriculum vitae, the court con-
cluded that he was an experienced radiologist, authored numerous arti-
cles, taught in the field of radiology, and performed the same type of X-
rays analysis at issue in the case on a daily basis. 83
2. Does Chapter 74 Require an Expert to be a Physician?
Another related issue is whether an expert, in order to be "qualified,"
must be a "physician." Courts looking at this issue concluded, based on
the plain language of sections 74.351(r)(5)(C) and (D), that an expert
76. Id. at 585.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(r)(5)(C) (West 2011)).
80. Id. (citing Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. 1996). In Broders, the court
rejected an argument that a medical doctor was able to testify about "all medical matters."
The court explained further that "given the increasingly specialized and technical nature of
medicine, there is no validity, if there ever was, to the notion that every licensed medical
doctor should be automatically qualified to testify as an expert on every medical question."
However, an expert may have a different specialty but still be able to testify if he or she has
other knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education that exists in the four corners of
the expert report.).
81. Id. at 587.




testifying on "causation" must be a physician, regardless of a proposed
expert's amount of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
regarding the specific issue before the court.s4 In College Station Medical
Center, the plaintiff submitted an expert report from a nurse who opined
about the cause of plaintiff's injuries sustained from a fall while trying to
make her way to her hospital room bathroom.8 5 The court relied on the
statute's plain language to conclude that a nurse is not a physician and is
therefore not qualified to render an expert opinion regarding causation.8 6
The Beaumont Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Pang-
burn v. Anderson.87 This does not mean, however, that chapter 74 com-
pletely precludes a nurse from submitting an expert report in a healthcare
liability case. In Hayes v. Carroll, the Austin Court of Appeals concluded
a nurse was qualified to give an opinion regarding the standard of care
applicable in an intensive care unit (as opposed to causation).88
Similar issues arise with respect to psychologists.8 9 In Rusk State Hos-
pital v. Black, the parents of a psychiatric patient filed a lawsuit after their
son asphyxiated himself with a plastic bag.90 In support of their medical
liability claim, the plaintiffs submitted a report from a psychologist alleg-
ing the hospital negligently allowed the victim access to the plastic bag,
which resulted in his death.91 The court acknowledged the expert had
extensive training and experience in diagnosis and treatment of mental
disorders, was a licensed psychologist in the State of Texas, and had a
clinical specialty in treatment of schizophrenia and other psychotic disor-
ders.92 Thus, he could testify regarding applicable standard of care pursu-
ant to section 74.402.93 However, despite his obviously sterling
credentials, the expert could not submit an expert report regarding causa-
tion because he was not a "physician" under Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code section 74.351(r)(5)(C). 94 Despite its holding, the court
of appeals seemed palpably uncomfortable with its conclusion noting:
"The causal connection between allowing a mental patient access to a
plastic bag and his suffocation death from such a bag placed over his head
seems too obvious to require explanation. '95
84. College Station Med. Ctr. LLC v. Todd, No. 10-09-00398-CV, 2010 WL 3434677, at
*2 (Tex. App.-Waco Sept. 1, 2010, pet. denied); Pangburn v. Anderson, No. 09-09-00169-
CV, 2009 WL 4852211, at *7 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Dec. 17, 2009, no pet.).
85. College Station Med. Ctr., 2010 WL 3434677, at *1.
86. Id. at *2-3.
87. Pangburn, 2009 WL 4852211, at *6.
88. Hayes v. Carroll, 314 S.W.3d 494, 505 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet. denied).
89. Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, No. 12-09-00206-CV, 2010 WL 2543470, at *5 (Tex.
App.-Tyler June 23, 2010, pet. granted). This case was appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court on unrelated issues including subject matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity.
90. Id. at *1.
91. Id.






The Fort Worth Court of Appeals agreed with Rusk State Hospital that
a clinical psychologist could submit an expert report regarding the appli-
cable standard of care but could not testify regarding causation. 96 In
Davisson, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants negligently caused one of
the plaintiffs-Mr. Nicholson-to develop an Adderall addiction and
psychosis by failing to properly, timely diagnose and monitor him.97 In
support of this claim, the plaintiffs submitted an expert report from a
clinical psychologist regarding the use of Adderall and proper treatment,
monitoring, and care of adult patients diagnosed with Attention Deficit
Disorder.98 Citing Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section
74.402, the court of appeals concluded the expert was qualified to opine
regarding the applicable standard of care.99 However, the expert was not
qualified to give an opinion on causation because he was a clinical and
forensic psychologist and not a physician.100 Nevertheless, the court of
appeals noted section 74.351(i) explicitly contemplates the use of multiple
expert reports in the same case.101 Thus, one expert can testify regarding
the standard of care for issues relating to clinical psychology, while causa-
tion is established by a second expert physician.
The critical issue in these cases is the manner in which the term "ex-
pert" is defined under chapter 74. For example, under section
74.351(r)(5)(B), an expert is a person qualified under section 74.402 with
respect to opinions regarding "a health care provider. '10 2 Section 74.402
does not reference "physicians," but rather states a person may qualify as
an expert witness on whether a "healthcare provider" departed from a
standard of care if, for example, the person practices in the same health-
care field. 10 3 Because this definition does not incorporate the term "phy-
sician," it would seemingly govern expert witnesses in non-physician
areas of healthcare practice. In contrast, section 74.351(r)(5)(A) specifi-
cally requires an expert to be a "physician" when testifying on departures
from accepted standards of physician medical care.1°4 Thus, the statute
contemplates different types of experts depending on the standard of care
and breach at issue.
The provisions in sections 74.351(r)(5)(A) and (B) plainly state that
different types of experts can opine on the standard of care and its
breach. However, causation is another story entirely, and the differences
in the courts' opinions can be explained by analyzing sections
74.351(r)(5)(C) through (E). Those provisions govern experts who are
opining on "the causal relationship between the injury, harm or damages
96. Davisson v. Nicholson, 310 S.W.3d 543, 550 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 2010, no
pet.).
97. Id. at 547.
98. Id. at 548.
99. Id. at 551-52.
100. id. at 557-59.
101. Id. at 557.
102. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 74.351(r)(5)(B) (West 2011).
103. Id. § 74.402(b)(1).
104. Id. § 74.351(r)(5)(A).
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claimed and the alleged departure from the applicable standard of
care."'10 5 Critically, however, these provisions only authorize physicians,
dentists, or podiatrists to give opinions regarding causation. There is no
similar provision in section 74.351 with respect to "healthcare providers"
in general. Thus, the statute appears to create a two-tiered expert system
in which non-physician providers-like psychologists and nurses-can
testify on the standard of care and any deviations, but cannot testify on
the causal link between the alleged breach of the standard of care and
resulting harm. Physicians, dentists, and podiatrists are not similarly im-
paired. Section 74.403(a) provides further clarification:
[I]n a suit involving a health care liability claim against a physician
or health care provider, a person may qualify as an expert witness on
the issue of the causal relationship between the alleged departure
from accepted standards of care and the injury, harm, or damages
claimed only if the person is a physician and is otherwise qualified to
render opinions on that causal relationship under the Texas Rules of
Evidence. 106
These cases raise some interesting questions regarding whether expert
opinions could or should be submitted by non-physicians in appropriate
circumstances. For example, it would seem logical that a licensed psy-
chologist should be able to opine on the manner in which a breach of a
standard of care in clinical psychology "caused" a resulting injury, partic-
ularly when the injury stems from slipping on a hospital floor or harming
oneself in a mental health care facility. But, the plain language of the
statute suggests otherwise, and Texas courts are unwilling to supplant the
will of the Texas Legislature on an expert's ability to report on causation.
3. After All This Time, Texas Case Law Interpreting Chapter 74
Continues to Raise New Questions Regarding the Timing of
Expert Reports.
In addition to imposing certain requirements with respect to reliability
of expert reports and qualifications of experts in health care liability
claims, chapter 74 contains detailed requirements regarding the timing of
service of expert reports. Under section 74.351:
(a) In a health care liability claim, a claimant shall, not later than
the 120th day after the date the original petition was filed, serve on
each party or the party's attorney one or more expert reports, with a
curriculum vitae of each expert listed in the report for each physician
or health care provider against whom a liability claim is asserted. 10 7
Although the statute's text appears clear, a recent case in the Austin
Court of Appeals discussed whether the phrase "original petition" refers
to the first-filed petition in a lawsuit even if it is subsequently amended to
105. Id. § 74.351(r)(5)(C)-(E).
106. Id. § 74.403(a).
107. Id. § 74.351(a) (emphasis added).
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add new parties, or whether the phrase refers to an original petition once
it is filed against a particular defendant.10 8 In Hayes, the defendants ar-
gued the term "original petition" refers to the first pleading filed in the
lawsuit, and therefore section 74.351 required the plaintiff to file an ex-
pert report on every defendant within 120 days regardless whether the
defendant was named in the Original Petition or added later by
amendment109
Relying on principles of statutory construction, the court of appeals
began its analysis by noting the plain language of the statute did not
clearly indicate whether the term "original petition" referred to the first
pleading filed in the "cause" or the first pleading filed against the particu-
lar defendant. 110 Because both constructions were permissible based on
the literal language of the statute, the court turned to the legislative his-
tory of chapter 74 for guidance.111 The court cited bill analyses prepared
by Texas House and Senate subcommittees handling the 2005 amendment
of section 74.351(a), which stated: "It was the intent of H.B. 4 that the
report be triggered by the filing of the lawsuit."1 2 The court of appeals
interpreted this to mean the 120-day period was triggered when a "law-
suit" was filed against a particular defendant (as opposed to when a
"cause" is filed with the initial petition). 13 The court also observed that
requiring a plaintiff to file an expert report 120 days after the initial
pleading would lead to impractical results: the plaintiff never could add
new defendants after the expiration of 120 days because he or she would
be precluded from filing an expert report against that party.114 Thus, the
court of appeals concluded that "[i]f the pleading is the first pleading
naming a defendant, it is the 'original' petition as to that defendant re-
gardless of its title, and the 120-day expert report deadline is triggered by
that filing as to that defendant." 115
4. Recent Case Law Presents an Interesting Analysis of the Interplay
Between the Rule 703 and Chapter 74 Expert Reports.
Other case law addresses the interplay of chapter 74 expert reports and
Texas Rule of Evidence 703, which provides that an expert may consider
inadmissible evidence if it is "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the sub-
ject.1 16 In Gannon v. Wyche, the Houston Court of Appeals considered
an argument that a physician's expert report in a chapter 74 healthcare
liability case could not rely on an unsworn, unauthenticated, and undated
108. Hayes v. Carroll, 314 S.W.3d 494, 499-502 (Tex. App.-Austin 2010, pet. denied).
109. Id. at 499.
110. Id. at 499-500.
111. Id. at 500.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 501.
115. Id.
116. TEx. R. EVID. 703.
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written statement in forming medical opinions. 117 The court of appeals
noted that experts in many instances rely on hearsay, privileged commu-
nications, and other otherwise inadmissible information. 118 The question,
however, was whether a chapter 74 report applied a different rule with
respect to facts relied upon by the expert. 1 9 The court of appeals re-
solved the issue by focusing on the purpose of expert reports in health-
care liability claims. Chapter 74 does not require such reports to meet
the same requirements as evidence offered in a summary judgment pro-
ceeding or at trial.120 Moreover, a trial court's determination of the ade-
quacy of an expert report under chapter 74 is a preliminary proceeding in
which the rules of evidence may not apply to the report or to the informa-
tion reviewed by the expert in preparing the report.121 The court of ap-
peals also cited persuasive authority stating: "Because Chapter 74
prohibits the introduction of expert reports into evidence, the Legislature
likely did not intend that expert reports and the evidence reviewed by
experts in preparing the reports must comply with the rules of evi-
dence." 122 This conclusion broadly suggests that none of the Texas Evi-
dence Rules apply to expert reports, and an expert preparing a chapter 74
report could plausibly rely on evidence otherwise inadmissible.
III. PRIVILEGES
A. ONE RECENT TEXAS CASE CLARIFIES WHETHER TRIAL COURTS
CAN ORDER THE DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED INFORMATION ON AN
"ATTORNEY'S EYES ONLY" BASIS (PRESUMABLY AN
ALREADY SETTLED ISSUE)
In In re Energy XXI Gulf Coast, Inc., the Houston Court of Appeals,
First District considered whether documents protected by the attorney-
client privilege and work product doctrine could be shared on an "attor-
ney's eyes only" basis with another party. 123 In this case, which involved
an insurance coverage dispute over a well blowout, a party sought docu-
ments from Energy XXI Gulf Coast that alleged they were protected by
the attorney-client and attorney work product privileges. 124 The relators
objected to the disclosure on the basis of the attorney-client and attorney
work product privileges, and the trial court ultimately conducted an in-
117. Gannon v. Wyche, 321 S.W.3d 881, 884 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010,
pet. denied).
118. Id. at 889 (citing In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Tex.
2007)).
119. Id. at 890.
120. Id. at 890-911 (citing Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 879
(Tex. 2001)).
121. Id. at 890.
122. Id. at 889 (citing Hiner v. Gaspard, No. 09-07-240-CV, 2007 WL 2493471, at *7
(Tex. App.-Beaumont Sep. 6, 2007, pet. denied)).
123. In re Energy XXI Gulf Coast Inc., No. 01-10-00371-CV, 2010 WL 5187730, at *1
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 23, 2010) (orig. proceeding).
124. Id. at *1.
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camera review of the documents.125 The trial court agreed that the docu-
ments were privileged but still ordered the documents's production "sub-
ject to the parties' protective order and for review on an attorney's eyes
only basis.' 26 This puzzling order seemed to conflate assertions of trade
secret privilege (in which a remedy might include an "attorney's eyes
only" review) with the work product privilege (in which documents are
not to be disclosed to the opposing party except under certain limited
circumstances). Predictably, the relators filed a mandamus proceeding
challenging the trial court's order. The court of appeals conditionally
granted the petition for writ of mandamus noting there was no authority
to support the proposition that a trial court has discretion to produce
privileged documents to an opposing party's attorney even if the docu-
ments qualify as attorneys' eyes only. 127
B. SEVERAL RECENT CASES RAISE INTERESTING QUESTIONS
REGARDING THE POTENTIAL WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE IN
DUAL REPRESENTATION SCENARIOS
There has been an interesting case during this Survey period regarding
whether a corporation's in-house counsel has the right to use privileged
documents on a personal basis when he or she obtained the documents
while representing the corporation. In Kennedy v. Gulf Coast Cancer &
Diagnostic Center, Gulf Coast's in-house counsel, Kirk Kennedy, engaged
law firm EBGWH to render an opinion regarding the corporation's po-
tential liability as a result of a former executive's alleged misconduct. 128
Kennedy subsequently shared the memorandum with his individual law-
yers and threatened to disclose the memorandum to the public, prompt-
ing Gulf Coast to seek a temporary injunction to prevent Kennedy from
using or disclosing the information in the memorandum. 129 The court of
appeals considered whether Kennedy, as an officer of Gulf Coast and an
existing client of EBGWH individually, could retain and use the legal
memorandum.' 30 The court concluded the memorandum was solely in-
tended for Gulf Coast, a legal entity separate and apart from the individ-
uals who composed the company.13' For example, the memorandum was
addressed to Gulf Coast's president, recited that EBGWH was "retained
by Gulf Coast," and indicated that EBGWH was asked by Kennedy to
apprise Gulf Coast's President and Board of Directors of the company's
potential exposure. 132 The memorandum also specifically stated:
"EBGWH has been retained only to provide advice to the Company and
125. Id. at *1-2.
126. Id. at *2.
127. Id. at *8.
128. Kennedy v. Gulf Coast Cancer & Diagnostic Ctr., 326 S.W.3d 352, 356 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
129. Id. at 355.
130. Id. at 357.
131. Id. at 358.
132. Id. at 356.
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is not providing advice or counsel to the Company's owners, officers or
directors, who should obtain independent counsel regarding any potential
risk to them in their individual capacities." 133 The court discounted Ken-
nedy's argument that he had requested EBGWH to prepare an analysis
for the company and its officers.13 4 The court noted there was no objec-
tive evidence (beyond simply Kennedy's subjective intent) showing
EBGWH represented the company and its officers and directors, and the
memorandum contained clear disclaimers to the contrary.
135
In a slightly different factual scenario, the Austin Court of Appeals dis-
cussed whether one client in a joint representation has the ability to
waive attorney-client privilege with respect to a second client under Texas
Rule of Evidence 511.136 In the underlying case that culminated in the
mandamus proceeding, the two parties-Lindig Construction and Truck-
ing and Richard Simmons-were defended by the same trial counsel pur-
suant to an insurance policy issued by Unitrin. 13 7 One of the clients,
Simmons, signed a written waiver of the attorney-client privilege, and the
plaintiffs in the underlying personal injury suit used the waiver to seek
discovery of invoices describing the legal services provided by trial coun-
sel in that suit.' 38 The plaintiffs argued the signed waiver was sufficient to
waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to all invoices, including
those involving trial counsel's work on behalf of Lindig.139 The court of
appeals disagreed, noting there was no Texas authority to support the
proposition that one client can waive the attorney-client privilege on be-
half of the other client.1 40 The court took note that under Texas Rule of
Evidence 503(5), the privilege does not apply to communications "rele-
vant to a matter of common interest between or among two or more cli-
ents if the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained
or consulted in common, when offered in an action between or among any
of the clients."'14 However, because the underlying litigation did not in-
volve a lawsuit between Unitrin's joint clients, Rule 503(5) did not
apply. 142
133. Id.
134. Id. at 358.
135. Id.
136. In re Unitrin Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-10-00384-CV, 2010 WL 2867326, at *2
(Tex. App.-Austin July 22, 2010) (orig. proceeding)).
137. Id. at *1.
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id.
140. Id.




IV. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS OF NOTE
A. ONE CASE IN THE SURVEY PERIOD RAISED ISSUES REGARDING
AUTHENTICATION OF VIDEOS OVERLAID BY INFORMATION
PRODUCED BY OTHER SOFTWARE
At least one case discussing Texas Rule of Evidence 901 provides use-
ful guidance regarding the authentication of documents. In Henry v. Bur-
lington Northern Santa Fe Corp., the Tyler Court of Appeals considered
whether the trial court properly admitted into evidence a video of a colli-
sion, because the video contained a software-based data overlay called
LocoCAM, which displays additional information such as the time, date,
speed, and location of the train.143 The opinion raises interesting ques-
tions in light of the evolving sophistication of video capture technologies.
The plaintiffs argued the software overlay was not properly authenticated
because the Burlington Northern employees testifying about the software
"knew nothing about how the software worked or anything at all about
the accuracy of the information displayed."'1 44
Under Texas Rule of Evidence 901(a), the requirement of authentica-
tion is "satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the mat-
ter in question is what its proponent claims."'1 45 This evidence could
"include testimony by a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is
claimed to be."1146 However, authentication is also established by circum-
stantial evidence including the appearance, content, substance, internal
patterns, and other distinctive characteristics in conjunction with circum-
stances of the evidence.1 47 Critically, however, there is no error to admis-
sion or exclusion of evidence if there is independent corroboration. 148
Regrettably, because other evidence of the time, date, speed, and loca-
tion of the train at the time of the accident existed, the court of appeals
ducked the question of whether the LocoCAM overlay itself was authen-
tic. 14 9 However, the case emphasizes that careful counsel should either
take steps to authenticate additional software and video elements inte-
grated with a video or audio display, or corroborate the additional over-
lay information through other evidence.
143. Henry v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., No. 12-08-00423-CV, 2010 WL 3582636, at
*1 (Tex. App.-Tyler Sep. 15, 2010, no pet.).
144. Id. at *3.
145. TEX. R. EvID. 901(a).






B. COURTS HAVE DISCUSSED THE SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE
BUSINESS RECORDS EXCEPTION BUT, SURPRISINGLY, ONE
CASE IN THE CIVIL CONTEXT ALSO DISCUSSES
THE STATE OF MIND EXCEPTION TO
THE HEARSAY RULE
The only cases identified during the Survey period that addressed the
Texas Rules of Evidence on hearsay focused on the business records ex-
ception-Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6)-and the state of mind excep-
tion-Texas Rule of Evidence 803(3). In In re Estate of Wren v.
Bastinelli, the plaintiffs Al and Sue Bastinelli sued under a written rental
agreement alleging the defendant's gross negligence resulted in the theft
and loss of their property after several break-ins. 150 The defendant
sought admission of two emails written by the property owner to his
daughter stating he had given the Bastinellis' contact information to the
police after an earlier break-in and changed the locks on the door.151 The
court of appeals disagreed the emails could fall within Texas Rule of Evi-
dence 803(3): the "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule.152 Be-
cause the emails were written after the lawsuit was filed, they were not
spontaneous statements about the property owner's state of mind during
the thefts, but rather his version of past events. 153 For similar reasons,
the emails did not fall under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6): the business
records exception to the hearsay rule.154 The court of appeals noted the
emails were prepared in anticipation of litigation and thus could not qual-
ify as business records for evidentiary purposes. ' 155
One last interesting note is the appellate court's treatment of the de-
fendant's offer of proof regarding certain proposed testimony that the
defendant argued was subject to a hearsay exception. At one point in the
trial, the defendant sought to introduce hearsay testimony from the Bas-
tinellis' witness to the effect the property owner told him he changed the
150. In re Estate of Wren v. Bastinelli, No. 06-09-00060-CV, 2010 WL 173828, at *1
(Tex. App.-Texarkana Jan. 20, 2010, pet. denied).
151. Id. at *2.
152. Id. Rule 803(3) provides: "A statement of the declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design,
mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief
to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation,
identification, or terms of declarant's will." TEX. R. EVID. 803(3).
153. Bastinelli, 2010 WL 173828, at *2.
154. Id. at *3. Rule 803(6) provides: "A memorandum, report, record, or data compila-
tion, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course
of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by affidavit that complies with
Rule 902(10), unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of prepara-
tion indicate lack of trustworthiness. 'Business' as used in this paragraph includes any and
every kind of regular organized activity whether conducted for profit or not." TEX. R.
EVID. 803(6).
155. Bastinelli, 2010 WL 173828, at *3.
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lock and believed police would contact the Bastinellis. 156 A critical prob-
lem occurred on appeal, however, because the defendant did not com-
plete a question and answer offer of proof but simply described the
testimony. 157 When the Bastinellis objected, arguing that their witness
would not testify according to the offer of proof, the court found it very
difficult to rule on the hearsay objection.158
This Survey period also raised the issue regarding whether one entity
could offer records into evidence under the business records exception to
the hearsay rule when it did not originally create the records but received
them from a second entity.159 In Simien v. Unifund CCR Partners, the
plaintiff Unifund CCR Partners sued Michelle D. Simien to recover dam-
ages as a result of her failure to repay a credit card account opened with
Citibank.160 Unifund purchased the debt from Citibank and then
brought suit to recover damages. 161 During the bench trial, the trial court
admitted a business records affidavit offered by Unifund and signed by
one of its employees, which attached a Unifund statement, an Assign-
ment from Citibank to Unifund, three Citibank monthly statements, and
a Citibank Card Agreement. 162 Simien objected to the evidence on the
basis that the business records affidavit failed to show that Unifund veri-
fied the accuracy of the records obtained from Citibank.1 63 The court of
appeals noted:
A document authored or created by a third party may be admissi-
ble as business records of a different business if: (a) the document is
incorporated and kept in the course of the testifying witness's busi-
ness; (b) that business typically relies upon the accuracy of the con-
tents of the document; and (c) the circumstances otherwise indicate
the trustworthiness of the document. 164
Applying these standards, the court of appeals concluded the trial court
properly admitted the Citibank records as records of Unifund under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule.165 First, because the evi-
dence showed Unifund kept the records received from Citibank in the
ordinary course of Unifund's business "as permanent records of the com-
pany," this sufficed to show Unifund's adoption and incorporation of the
records. 166 Second, although Unifund did not confirm the accuracy of
Citibank's records, Unifund's reasonable reliance on the accuracy of Ci-
156. Id. at *1-2.
157. Id. at *2.
158. Id.
159. Simien v. Unifund CCR Partners, 321 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
160. Id. at 239.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 240.
164. Id.; see TEx. R. EvID. 803(6).
165. Id. at 245.
166. Id. at 242.
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tibank's documents sufficed for the business records exception. '167 Fi-
nally, the court of appeals concluded that the third-party documents had
a high degree of trustworthiness because they were created by an entity
that is ordinarily required to keep careful records of its customers' credit
card accounts. 168 Critically, the court of appeals did not agree that
Unifund's employees needed personal knowledge of Citibank's record-
keeping practices. 169
The Beaumont Court of Appeals adopted the Simien three-part test to
determine whether one entity could "adopt" the documents of a second
entity for purposes of the business records exception.170 In Nice v.
Dodeka, L.L.C., the plaintiff opened a credit card account with Chase
that required repayment based on accounting provided by Chase in
monthly credit card statements. 71 The credit card debt was subsequently
sold to Unifund (the same party in the Simien case) and then sold to
Dodeka, L.L.C. 172 The court of appeals considered whether business
records created by one entity that later become the primary records of
another entity are still admissible as records of regularly conducted activ-
ity under Rule 803(6).173 The court of appeals concluded that the Simien
three-part test had been met on the basis of several affidavits submitted
by the defendant's custodians where the witnesses swore that: (1) they
were record custodians; (2) they were personally familiar with how
Dodeka prepared and maintained its records; and (3) they had personal
knowledge of Unifund's business record practices. 174 Moreover, both
custodians vouched for the accuracy of the records initially created by
Chase and then subsequently maintained by Unifund. 175 (These state-
ments seem conclusory because Dodeka's custodians were twice-removed
from Chase's process of generating the business records and once-re-
moved from Unifund's processes for maintaining the records. But as dis-
cussed above in Simien, all that is required is reasonable reliance with
respect to accuracy of the records.) Finally, the court of appeals took
great solace that the two affidavits were in a substantially correct form
that complied with Texas Rule of Evidence 902(10)(b).
C. RELEVANCE AND PREJUDICE (RULES 401 AND 403)
There were few cases relating to Rules 401 and 403 of the Texas Rules
of Evidence, but one in particular deserves mention due to an allegated
167. Id. at 243.
168. Id. at 244.
169. Id.
170. Nice v. Dodeka, L.L.C., No. 09-10-00014-CV, 2010 WL 4514174, at *4 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont Nov. 10, 2010, no pet.).
171. Id. at *1.
172. Id.





spoliation of evidence by one party.176 Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Al-
dridge involved a premises liability case in which the plaintiff was injured
after slipping on a liquid substance.177 The defendant, Brookshire Broth-
ers, preserved a store video recording just before the accident but re-
corded over other portions of the tape that could have shown the source
of the spill, who may have seen the spill, or the amount of effort needed
to clean the spill.178 The trial court admitted evidence regarding destruc-
tion of the tape and issued a spoliation instruction to the jury.179 Brook-
shire Brothers argued during trial that the evidence of the tape's
destruction was improperly prejudicial under Texas Rule of Evidence
403.180 The court of appeals noted, however, that the evidence could be
properly submitted to the jury unless the only basis for the spoliation
accusation consists of speculation or conjecture, or there is a reasonable
explanation for the missing evidence.' 8 ' The court concluded there was
insufficient evidence for these elements. 182
D. WITNESS CHARACTER (RULE 6 08(B))
It is not often that case law presents a civil evidence issue with respect
to Rule 608. However, during the survey period, the Texas Supreme
Court addressed this very issue in TXI Transportation Co. v. Hughes.183
In Hughes, the supreme court discussed whether it was error for a trial
court to admit evidence regarding the immigration status of a commercial
truck driver that caused a collision resulting in the deaths of several mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' family.184 In a divided decision, the court of appeals
concluded the driver's illegal status was relevant impeachment evidence
or, alternatively, harmless error.185 The supreme court reversed the court
of appeals's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. 186
During trial, the plaintiffs solicited testimony and offered extrinsic evi-
dence regarding the driver's immigration status after he testified he never
lied to get a driver's license and did not know if he had a legal right to
work in the United States. 187 The supreme court first noted the driver's
testimony regarding his immigration status could not be used for im-
peachment of prior inconsistent statements because it was a collateral
matter not relevant to proving a material issue in the case. 188 The su-
preme court then analyzed Texas Rule of Evidence 608(b), which pro-
176. Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, No. 12-08-00368-CV, 2010 WL 2982902, at *1
(Tex. App.-Tyler Jul. 30, 2010, pet. filed).
177. Id. at *1.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *6, *8.
181. Id. at *8.
182. Id. at *9.
183. TXI Transp. Co. v. Hughes, 306 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2010).
184. Id. at 233.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 241.
188. Id. at 241-42.
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vides: "Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of
attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than the conviction
of a crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be inquired into on cross-
examination of the witness nor provided by extrinsic evidence. ''189 The
supreme court concluded that under this rule, a witness's immigration sta-
tus is not admissible to impugn his character for truthfulness.190 The su-
preme court also disagreed that any error associated with the
immigration testimony was harmless. The supreme court noted repeated
and extensive testimony and extrinsic evidence from several witnesses re-
garding the driver's immigration problems, including testimony from the
driver himself, TXI representatives, and the investigating DPS trooper.191
This testimony was not "harmless" because of the prejudicial effect such
testimony would have on a jury. 192 In a particularly resonant passage, the
supreme court observed:
The record shows that Hughes sought to hedge his theory by call-
ing attention to Rodriguez's illegal immigration status whenever he
could. Such appeals to racial and ethnic prejudices, whether "ex-
plicit and brazen" or "veiled and subtle," cannot be tolerated be-
cause they undermine the very basis of our judicial process."'1 93
V. CONCLUSION
The cases discussed above reflect the relative emphasis courts place on
expert evidence issues. Not surprisingly, the vast majority of cases dis-
cussing civil evidence relate to Texas Rule of Evidence 702 and related
concepts in chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Courts in civil cases also tend to focus on certain exceptions to the hear-
say rule-for example, the business records exception-that are common
in such cases. Nevertheless, this Survey period includes several interest-
ing cases that explore concepts of relevance, prejudice, and attacks on a
witness's character.
189. Id. at 242 (quoting excerpts of TEX. R. EVID. 608(b)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 242 (quoting excerpts of TEX. R. EVID. 608(b)).
192. Id. at 243.
193. Id. at 245.
2011]
136 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
